Moneyball" is a book that came out recently about Billy Beane, General Manager of the Oakland As.

It takes a close look at Beanes successful stewardship of the team, noting that the As have had one of the lowest payrolls in baseball, yet theyve racked up an astonishing number of victories, putting them in the playoffs several times.

Beane and his staff are basically, numbers crunchers, quant nerds, if you will. They track every major league ballplayer according to certain performance categories.

But their snapshot of a hitter isnt based only on batting average, stolen bases, home runs, and fielding percentages. They look at on-base percentage, runs scored, and other measures.

This makes a player who draws a lot of walks, in addition to hitting for average, more valuable than a guy who only hits for average. It also rewards those who get on base any way they can, through errors and fielders choices.

Beanes breakthrough is in highlighting less sexy, yet very significant statistics, which he claims are more reliable indicators of a players value than other factors. Thus, hes been able to buy, at a discount, players for his cash-poor team, that are undervalued, under-appreciated, but who can make an important contribution to the As, nonetheless.

This wisdom, knowing what statistics count, is incredibly important in sales, customer service, and other business areas. The real question is this one: are we measuring the right things, valuing our players appropriately, and putting our emphasis behind the best possible winning strategy or game plan?

Typically, we use measures and statistics that are traditionally used, that have been handed down to us. Seldom do we even take a hard look at whether theyre serving us or disserving us. And even less do we throw them out and field an entirely new set of metrics.

My father, for instance, was the top salesman wherever he worked because he knew how to leverage his assets. He handpicked his own prospecting lists, which was the marketing side of his job, and then he called them to set appointments.

But what set him apart from his peers was his canny ability to know, through rational analysis, and after the briefest contact, who NOT to pursue.

He had a great ear for B.S. and for sincere interest, he knew the difference, and he never second-guessed his instincts.

So, overall, he saw fewer people, followed-up less, but he closed a higher percentage of deals, that yielded more commissions for him and more profit for the house.

A traditional numbers-crunching manager, and he had a few, would look at his activity logs and scratch his head. It wouldnt add up.

His approach to Dad would be to urge him to see more people; it was only logical, but wrong. Dad was seeing the best ones, ignoring the rest, but his NOT-DOING was the highest form of action.

Where is the statistic that quantifies DISQUALIFYING prospects?

We dont ask our reps, who did you choose NOT to see, today, and not to call back, and not to leave messages with, and not to take notes about, and not to dream of closing?

In baseball, Beane and Company examine the number of pitches hitters take without swinging; how deeply they take pitchers into the count. He measures NOT-DOING, which in this case is not swinging the bat, knowing when hitters take pitchers deeper into counts:

(1) They see better pitches to hit with a 3-1 count than with a 1-1, or 2-2 count;

(2) They wear out the pitchers, forcing opponents to rely on their less capable bullpen hurlers; and

(3) These advantages mean Beanes crew will score more runs and fatigue the other team by keeping them on the field longer, doing defense.

Dad didnt exhaust himself. He let his peers do that, and as long as they were under performing, he looked great, and he could claim higher and higher commissions as his rightful due.

He played Moneyball.

Are you?